Quantum key distribution involves establishing a key between a sender (“Alice”) and a receiver (“Bob”) by using weak (e.g., 0.1 photon on average) optical signals transmitted over a “quantum channel.” The security of the key distribution is based on the quantum mechanical principle that any measurement of a quantum system in unknown state will modify its state. As a consequence, an eavesdropper (“Eve”) that attempts to intercept or otherwise measure the quantum signal will introduce errors into the transmitted signals, thereby revealing her presence.
The general principles of quantum cryptography were first set forth by Bennett and Brassard in their article “Quantum Cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing,” Proceedings of the International Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India, 1984, pp. 175–179 (IEEE, New York, 1984). Specific QKD systems are described in U.S. Pat. No. 5,307,410 to Bennett, and in the publication by C. H. Bennett entitled “Quantum Cryptography Using Any Two Non-Orthogonal States”, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68 3121 (1992). The general process for performing QKD is described in the book by Bouwmeester et al., “The Physics of Quantum Information,” Springer-Verlag 2001, in Section 2.3, pages 27–33.
The above-mentioned references describe a so-called “one-way” QKD system wherein Alice randomly encodes the polarization or phase of single photons, and Bob randomly measures the polarization or phase of the photons. The one-way system described in the Bennett 1992 paper and incorporated by reference herein is based on a shared interferometric system. Respective parts of the interferometric system are accessible by Alice and Bob so that each can control the phase of the interferometer. The signals (pulses) sent from Alice to Bob are time-multiplexed and follow different paths. As a consequence, the interferometers need to be actively stabilized to within a few tens of nanoseconds during transmission to compensate for thermal drifts.
U.S. Pat. No. 6,438,234 to Gisin (the '234 patent), which patent is incorporated herein by reference, discloses a so-called “two-way” QKD system that is autocompensated for polarization and thermal variations. Thus, the two-way QKD system of the '234 patent is less susceptible to environmental effects than a one-way system.
When operating a QKD system in practice (e.g., in a commercial setting), multiple variables need to be aligned in time and then maintained aligned for optimal system performance. For example, in a commercial QKD system one or more single-photon detectors (SPDs) are gated with one or more corresponding detector gating signals from a controller to synchronize the detection of optical pulses with expected pulse arrival times. However, once the system is set up, the timing drifts due to various systemic and environmental factors (e.g., temperature) and the photon count can drop. This leads to a reduction in the transmission rate of the system, and also to an increase in the bit—error rate—i.e., to diminished system performance.
Laboratory and prototype QKD systems can be adjusted to account for system drifts can under very controlled and artificial conditions. However, making the same kinds of adjustments for a commercial QKD system in the field is a far more daunting endeavor. And, unlike with a laboratory or prototype QKD system, end-users of commercial QKD systems have an expectation that their QKD system will automatically run in an optimal state with minimal or no operator intervention.
The various elements depicted in the drawings are merely representational and are not necessarily drawn to scale. Certain sections thereof may be exaggerated, while others may be minimized. The drawings are intended to illustrate various embodiments of the invention that can be understood and appropriately carried out by those of ordinary skill in the art.